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POST /api/v1/keys/acl/get

Read a key's ACL.

Returns the ACL of the key named by ttag, as the key server currently holds it.

WARNING: rights masks are WIDENED by the key server, so an entry may carry bits nobody asked for -- READ accompanies WRITE, and an owner entry carries more still. Test them with a mask AND, never with equality.

Principal ids come back as DECIMAL STRINGS and feed straight back into the grant, update and revoke routes and into POST /api/v1/keys/export. ACL and entry ids are opaque base64 handles. Access-window stamps are base64 of the raw 8-byte value, with startTimeUnset / endTimeUnset reporting the all-zero "no window" default rather than converting it into a date it does not mean.

WARNING: a 404 here does NOT mean the key is unknown. It means the key server resolved no ACL for that link. A hidden link naming no key on this server is read as naming a FOREIGN key and refused by the key server, which arrives as a 500.

The ACL of an expired key is still read, with expired: true: an expiry keeps the key's record and refuses every use of the key, not the reading of its ACL. A key removed from this key server (POST /api/v1/keys/remove) answers 404 ACL_NOT_FOUND.

Authentication​

Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.

This surface sets no cookie

There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.

Request​

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
ttagstringyesCanonical base64. Must decode to at least one byte.

Example

{
  "ttag": "..."
}

Responses​

200​

The ACL.

FieldTypeRequiredDescription
aclIdstringno
hiddenLinkobjectnoThe hidden link as the key server reports it on the ACL object. Its shape is the key server's and is passed through unchanged; do not depend on it. Use the ttag you sent.
expiredbooleanno
entryCountintegerno
entriesarray of AclEntrynoOne ACL entry -- one principal's rights over one key.
detailstringno

Example

{
  "aclId": "...",
  "hiddenLink": {},
  "expired": true,
  "entryCount": 0,
  "entries": [
    {
      "principalId": "...",
      "systemId": 0,
      "aclEntryId": "...",
      "aclId": "...",
      "rights": 0,
      "rightNames": [
        "OWNER"
      ],
      "maxUsage": -1,
      "userRight": 0,
      "startTime": "...",
      "startTimeUnset": true,
      "endTime": "...",
      "endTimeUnset": true
    }
  ],
  "detail": "..."
}

400​

The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server.

Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name.

INVALID_ARGUMENT is the one 400 that DID reach the key server: the key server itself refused the argument (ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT), and detail is its own sentence. On POST /api/v1/certificates/enroll that is a certificate that cannot authenticate -- certificate not permitted for authentication: keyUsage is present without digitalSignature (...), ... extendedKeyUsage is present without clientAuth (...), or certificate expired at enrolment: notAfter <UTC> ... -- and a multi-certificate body that carries one such leaf persists nothing.

KEY_UNWRAP_FAILED reached the key server too, on POST /api/v1/keys/import with format WRAPPED: the wrapped key did not unwrap under the key server's trust certificate -- wrapped to another key, by another method, or damaged. Nothing was stored for that key.

401​

No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses.

SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying.

PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here.

SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.

CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence. detail is the key server's sentence. The Gateway answers this once and then ENDS everything that service holds or minted here -- its sessions, the delegated sessions and the scoped credentials it minted -- so a later operation on any of them is SESSION_NOT_FOUND. Log in with a different certificate.

SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED -- a single-sign-on session (POST /api/v1/session/oidc) reached its lifetime, or was idle past its binding's idle bound; it has been ended. Sign in again.

SENDER_KEY_RETIRED -- the session's registered sender key was rotated out and its overlap has passed (see "The registered service's credential lifecycle"); the session is closed with this answer. SERVICE_REGISTRATION_ENDED -- the registration a service credential was issued under was removed or narrowed on this Gateway; it has ended. Both are final for that credential.

403​

OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE, or ACCESS_DENIED. Note the key server's own authorization for reading an ACL is role-gated as well as ACL-gated, and the two are separate checks.

404​

ACL_NOT_FOUND -- no ACL resolved for that link. Nothing was modified. See the warning above about what this is not.

500​

A fault rather than a refusal.

OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.

503​

A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.

A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.

BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/v1/health and GET /api/v1/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/v1/ready says when.

CAPACITY_UNAVAILABLE (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): this Gateway is serving its maximum number of requests at once, or cannot track another allowance, or (on a certificate login) is recording its maximum of live certificate sessions -- in which case the session the login created has been closed. Nothing else was sent to the key server. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.

413​

PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (retryable: false) -- the request body is larger than this deployment accepts. It was refused before it was parsed, and the connection is closed. Nothing was sent to the key server.

429​

RATE_LIMITED (retryable: true, Retry-After) -- the allowance this request is charged to is spent: the login allowance of its network source (before authentication), or the allowance, the concurrency ceiling or the live-session ceiling of the identity it was verified as -- shared by every session that identity holds, including every delegated and scoped credential a service minted. It carries no scope. Nothing was sent to the key server; on a login refused after authentication, the session it created has been closed. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.

Error handling​

Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.

StatusMeaning
400The request was refused before anything was sent to the key server. Most 400s on this surface carry code: BAD_REQUEST and a detail naming the field and saying what the key server would otherwise have done with it. A large share of them exist because the value would have been ACCEPTED downstream and quietly meant something else -- an empty string that reaches the wire as "mint a new key", a zero-length identifier that names no object, a numeric flag word that clears bits the caller did not name. INVALID_ARGUMENT is the one 400 that DID reach the key server: the key server itself refused the argument (ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT), and detail is its own sentence. On POST /api/v1/certificates/enroll that is a certificate that cannot authenticate -- certificate not permitted for authentication: keyUsage is present without digitalSignature (...), ... extendedKeyUsage is present without clientAuth (...), or certificate expired at enrolment: notAfter <UTC> ... -- and a multi-certificate body that carries one such leaf persists nothing. KEY_UNWRAP_FAILED reached the key server too, on POST /api/v1/keys/import with format WRAPPED: the wrapped key did not unwrap under the key server's trust certificate -- wrapped to another key, by another method, or damaged. Nothing was stored for that key.
401No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces. CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence. detail is the key server's sentence. The Gateway answers this once and then ENDS everything that service holds or minted here -- its sessions, the delegated sessions and the scoped credentials it minted -- so a later operation on any of them is SESSION_NOT_FOUND. Log in with a different certificate. SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED -- a single-sign-on session (POST /api/v1/session/oidc) reached its lifetime, or was idle past its binding's idle bound; it has been ended. Sign in again. SENDER_KEY_RETIRED -- the session's registered sender key was rotated out and its overlap has passed (see "The registered service's credential lifecycle"); the session is closed with this answer. SERVICE_REGISTRATION_ENDED -- the registration a service credential was issued under was removed or narrowed on this Gateway; it has ended. Both are final for that credential.
403OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE, or ACCESS_DENIED. Note the key server's own authorization for reading an ACL is role-gated as well as ACL-gated, and the two are separate checks.
404ACL_NOT_FOUND -- no ACL resolved for that link. Nothing was modified. See the warning above about what this is not.
500A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After. BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/v1/health and GET /api/v1/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/v1/ready says when. CAPACITY_UNAVAILABLE (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): this Gateway is serving its maximum number of requests at once, or cannot track another allowance, or (on a certificate login) is recording its maximum of live certificate sessions -- in which case the session the login created has been closed. Nothing else was sent to the key server. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.
413PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (retryable: false) -- the request body is larger than this deployment accepts. It was refused before it was parsed, and the connection is closed. Nothing was sent to the key server.
429RATE_LIMITED (retryable: true, Retry-After) -- the allowance this request is charged to is spent: the login allowance of its network source (before authentication), or the allowance, the concurrency ceiling or the live-session ceiling of the identity it was verified as -- shared by every session that identity holds, including every delegated and scoped credential a service minted. It carries no scope. Nothing was sent to the key server; on a login refused after authentication, the session it created has been closed. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.