POST /api/v1/keys/acl/revoke

Remove a principal's ACL entry entirely.

Removes the WHOLE entry identified by (aclId, systemId, principalId), then verifies by the entry being absent from a fresh read.

WARNING: rights is not accepted on this route and sending it is a 400. There is no partial revocation of individual bits: the entry is identified by its compare key and removed entire. A mask here would look like a partial revocation and would silently do the other thing. To reduce a principal to fewer rights, use POST /api/v1/keys/acl/update with the mask you want it to end up with.

Authentication

Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.

This surface sets no cookie

There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.

Request

Field	Type	Required	Description
ttag	string	yes	Canonical base64.
systemId	integer	yes
principalId	integer or string	yes
maxUsage	integer	no
startTime	string	no	base64 of exactly 8 bytes: big-endian 64-bit UTC seconds.
endTime	string	no	base64 of exactly 8 bytes: big-endian 64-bit UTC seconds.

Example

{
  "ttag": "...",
  "systemId": 0,
  "principalId": 0,
  "maxUsage": 0,
  "startTime": "...",
  "endTime": "..."
}

Responses

200

The entry is gone, verified by its ABSENCE from a fresh read.

Field	Type	Required	Description
code	string	no	Absent on success; NOT_VERIFIED when the read-back disagrees.
operation	string	no	Which key-server operation was sent.
verified	boolean	no
requestedRights	integer or null	no	Null on revoke, which takes no rights.
requestedRightNames	array or null	no
entry	AclEntry or variant	no	The matching entry from the fresh read, or null. Null is the SUCCESS case on revoke.
acl	AclInfo	no
detail	string	no

entry — AclEntry

Field	Type	Required	Description
principalId	string	no	Decimal string. Feeds straight back into the grant/update/revoke routes and into export.
systemId	integer	no
aclEntryId	string	no	base64 opaque handle
aclId	string	no	base64 opaque handle
rights	integer	no	The rights bitmask AS THE KEY SERVER HOLDS IT. The key server WIDENS what is asked for -- requesting WRITE reads back as WRITE|READ -- so test this with a mask AND, never with equality.
rightNames	array of string (OWNER, READ, WRITE, MANDATORY_GROUP, HOST_MATRIX)	no
maxUsage	integer	no	The number of uses REMAINING; -1 means no limit. The count is consumed on every use of the key under this entry, warm or cold, on the key server and through a remote engine; a start/end bound is enforced on every use; -1 (USAGE_NO_LIMIT) is unlimited; a group entry's count is consumed by any member's use.
userRight	integer	no
startTime	string	no	the key server's time_t as big-endian 64-bit UTC seconds -- 8 raw bytes, base64 (struct.pack(">Q", s))
startTimeUnset	boolean	no	True when the stamp is all zero -- the "no window" default, reported rather than converted into a date it does not mean.
endTime	string	no	the key server's time_t as big-endian 64-bit UTC seconds -- 8 raw bytes, base64 (struct.pack(">Q", s))
endTimeUnset	boolean	no

AclInfo

Field	Type	Required	Description
aclId	string	no
hiddenLink	object	no	The hidden link as the key server reports it on the ACL object. Its shape is the key server's and is passed through unchanged; do not depend on it. Use the ttag you sent.
expired	boolean	no
entryCount	integer	no
entries	array of AclEntry	no	One ACL entry -- one principal's rights over one key.

Example

{
  "code": "...",
  "operation": "...",
  "verified": true,
  "requestedRights": 0,
  "requestedRightNames": [
    "..."
  ],
  "entry": {
    "principalId": "...",
    "systemId": 0,
    "aclEntryId": "...",
    "aclId": "...",
    "rights": 0,
    "rightNames": [
      "OWNER"
    ],
    "maxUsage": -1,
    "userRight": 0,
    "startTime": "...",
    "startTimeUnset": true,
    "endTime": "...",
    "endTimeUnset": true
  },
  "acl": {
    "aclId": "...",
    "hiddenLink": {},
    "expired": true,
    "entryCount": 0,
    "entries": [
      {
        "principalId": "...",
        "systemId": 0,
        "aclEntryId": "...",
        "aclId": "...",
        "rights": 0,
        "rightNames": [
          "..."
        ],
        "maxUsage": -1,
        "userRight": 0,
        "startTime": "...",
        "startTimeUnset": true,
        "endTime": "...",
        "endTimeUnset": true
      }
    ]
  },
  "detail": "..."
}

400

BAD_REQUEST. Includes sending rights, which this route refuses by name -- see the warning above.

401

No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses.

SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying.

PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here.

SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces.

CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence. detail is the key server's sentence. The Gateway answers this once and then ENDS everything that service holds or minted here -- its sessions, the delegated sessions and the scoped credentials it minted -- so a later operation on any of them is SESSION_NOT_FOUND. Log in with a different certificate.

SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED -- a single-sign-on session (POST /api/v1/session/oidc) reached its lifetime, or was idle past its binding's idle bound; it has been ended. Sign in again.

SENDER_KEY_RETIRED -- the session's registered sender key was rotated out and its overlap has passed (see "The registered service's credential lifecycle"); the session is closed with this answer. SERVICE_REGISTRATION_ENDED -- the registration a service credential was issued under was removed or narrowed on this Gateway; it has ended. Both are final for that credential.

403

OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE or ACCESS_DENIED.

404

ACL_NOT_FOUND -- and no removal was attempted.

409

NOT_VERIFIED -- the entry is still present in the read-back.

410

KEY_EXPIRED (retryable: false) -- the key the request named was expired (POST /api/v1/keys/expire). Its record is kept, and every use of it -- decrypt, encrypt under its t-Tag, export, an access-control grant or update -- is refused, on every key server of the deployment. An expiry is never undone; the key's owner may still remove it.

500

A fault rather than a refusal.

OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.

502

READBACK_FAILED.

503

A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.

A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After.

BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/v1/health and GET /api/v1/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/v1/ready says when.

CAPACITY_UNAVAILABLE (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): this Gateway is serving its maximum number of requests at once, or cannot track another allowance, or (on a certificate login) is recording its maximum of live certificate sessions -- in which case the session the login created has been closed. Nothing else was sent to the key server. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.

413

PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (retryable: false) -- the request body is larger than this deployment accepts. It was refused before it was parsed, and the connection is closed. Nothing was sent to the key server.

429

RATE_LIMITED (retryable: true, Retry-After) -- the allowance this request is charged to is spent: the login allowance of its network source (before authentication), or the allowance, the concurrency ceiling or the live-session ceiling of the identity it was verified as -- shared by every session that identity holds, including every delegated and scoped credential a service minted. It carries no scope. Nothing was sent to the key server; on a login refused after authentication, the session it created has been closed. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.

Error handling

Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.

Status	Meaning
400	BAD_REQUEST. Includes sending rights, which this route refuses by name -- see the warning above.
401	No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces. CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence. detail is the key server's sentence. The Gateway answers this once and then ENDS everything that service holds or minted here -- its sessions, the delegated sessions and the scoped credentials it minted -- so a later operation on any of them is SESSION_NOT_FOUND. Log in with a different certificate. SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED -- a single-sign-on session (POST /api/v1/session/oidc) reached its lifetime, or was idle past its binding's idle bound; it has been ended. Sign in again. SENDER_KEY_RETIRED -- the session's registered sender key was rotated out and its overlap has passed (see "The registered service's credential lifecycle"); the session is closed with this answer. SERVICE_REGISTRATION_ENDED -- the registration a service credential was issued under was removed or narrowed on this Gateway; it has ended. Both are final for that credential.
403	OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE or ACCESS_DENIED.
404	ACL_NOT_FOUND -- and no removal was attempted.
409	NOT_VERIFIED -- the entry is still present in the read-back.
410	KEY_EXPIRED (retryable: false) -- the key the request named was expired (POST /api/v1/keys/expire). Its record is kept, and every use of it -- decrypt, encrypt under its t-Tag, export, an access-control grant or update -- is refused, on every key server of the deployment. An expiry is never undone; the key's owner may still remove it.
500	A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
502	READBACK_FAILED.
503	A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After. BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/v1/health and GET /api/v1/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/v1/ready says when. CAPACITY_UNAVAILABLE (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): this Gateway is serving its maximum number of requests at once, or cannot track another allowance, or (on a certificate login) is recording its maximum of live certificate sessions -- in which case the session the login created has been closed. Nothing else was sent to the key server. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.
413	PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (retryable: false) -- the request body is larger than this deployment accepts. It was refused before it was parsed, and the connection is closed. Nothing was sent to the key server.
429	RATE_LIMITED (retryable: true, Retry-After) -- the allowance this request is charged to is spent: the login allowance of its network source (before authentication), or the allowance, the concurrency ceiling or the live-session ceiling of the identity it was verified as -- shared by every session that identity holds, including every delegated and scoped credential a service minted. It carries no scope. Nothing was sent to the key server; on a login refused after authentication, the session it created has been closed. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.