POST /api/v1/config/update
Write attributes into the key server configuration, and verify by re-reading.
Applies a batch of attribute writes and verifies each one against a FRESH read taken afterwards.
This route does NOT take the key server's own wire shape. The underlying operation
takes a whole serialized XML ELEMENT per path; this surface builds that element itself,
from {xpath, attr, value} triples, so that a caller cannot attach an attribute that
changes which node a path resolves to, set the access flag, or rewrite attributes it did
not name.
value must be a STRING. A JSON number or boolean would be stringified by some other
layer and the stored form would not be the one you sent.
attr: "accessFlag" is refused at the door. It is the one genuine silent no-op left on
this operation: the key server SKIPS that attribute inside its apply loop while the batch
still returns success, so a caller sending it would be told the write landed when nothing
happened.
An unresolvable xpath refuses the WHOLE batch before the wire, as a 400 naming
every offender. The key server would refuse it too -- one bad entry rejects the entire
batch -- but as a 500 naming only the first.
WARNING: the batch is ALL-OR-NOTHING at the key server, and a non-writable node
rejects it before anything is applied. That refusal arrives as a 500 carrying the key
server's own message, which names the node.
WARNING: observed is reported ONLY for an allow-listed (element, attribute) pair.
For anything else applied is computed over the stored value but the value itself does
not leave this process -- a route that echoed back what it just stored would be a
credential oracle.
WARNING: an idempotent write cannot be distinguished from one that never happened. If the submitted value already equalled the stored one, the comparison matches either way.
Authentication
Send the session id as Authorization: Bearer <session id>, and an RFC 9449 DPoP proof in the DPoP header if your session is bound to a key. The two are required together, not as alternatives — see Authenticating and Proving you hold your key.
There is no session cookie on any response and none is read on any request. Do not set credentials: "include" on a browser fetch.
Request
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
writes | array of object | yes |
writes[] object
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
xpath | string | yes | Must name an ELEMENT. The literal root is refused -- an attribute write needs an element. |
attr | string | yes | accessFlag is refused. |
value | string | yes | Must be a string. |
Example
{
"writes": [
{
"xpath": "...",
"attr": "...",
"value": "..."
}
]
}
Responses
200
Every requested write is present in a fresh read taken after the update.
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
code | string | no | Absent on success; NOT_VERIFIED otherwise. |
verified | boolean | no | |
batchSize | integer | no | |
outcomes | array of object | no | |
detail | string | no |
outcomes[] object
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
xpath | string | no | |
attr | string | no | |
applied | boolean | no | |
observed | string | no | Present ONLY for an allow-listed (element, attribute) pair. For anything else applied is computed and the value itself does not leave the process. |
reason | string | no | Present when applied is false. |
Example
{
"code": "...",
"verified": true,
"batchSize": 0,
"outcomes": [
{
"xpath": "...",
"attr": "...",
"applied": true,
"observed": "...",
"reason": "..."
}
],
"detail": "..."
}
400
BAD_REQUEST -- writes absent, not an array or empty; an entry malformed; attr is accessFlag; value not a string; or one or more xpaths do not resolve, in which case the whole batch was refused BEFORE the wire and the detail names every offender.
401
No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses.
SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds.
SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential
rather than retrying.
PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the
full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the
rest are here.
SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use
does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen
handle produces.
CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server
re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it
is now named by revocation evidence. detail is the key server's sentence. The
Gateway answers this once and then ENDS everything that service holds or minted here --
its sessions, the delegated sessions and the scoped credentials it minted -- so a later
operation on any of them is SESSION_NOT_FOUND. Log in with a different certificate.
SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED -- a single-sign-on session (POST /api/v1/session/oidc) reached
its lifetime, or was idle past its binding's idle bound; it has been ended. Sign in again.
SENDER_KEY_RETIRED -- the session's registered sender key was rotated out and its
overlap has passed (see "The registered service's credential lifecycle"); the session is
closed with this answer. SERVICE_REGISTRATION_ENDED -- the registration a service
credential was issued under was removed or narrowed on this Gateway; it has ended. Both
are final for that credential.
403
Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal
came from: ACCESS_DENIED (no role grants the operation), ACL_DENIED (the ACL of the
key the request named refuses the principal -- ask the key's owner, not an administrator),
PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled,
lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked; its
detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until
an administrator restores it. REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE and
REVOCATION_EVIDENCE_STALE are the key server's too, on a session established by
certificate login: the same re-check found no current revocation evidence for that
certificate's issuer under a policy that requires it -- the credential is not
what was refused, and an operator importing a current CRL for the issuer is what helps.
TRANSPORT_PRINCIPAL_REQUIRED (POST /api/v1/keys/get: the operation needs a session
established by a certificate the key server has enrolled) and PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH (the
request named a principal other than the session's) are the key server's too, and no role
changes either -- while
NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and
OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent.
409
NOT_VERIFIED -- the key server did not refuse the batch, and the read-back does not show every requested value stored.
500
A fault rather than a refusal.
OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified
pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key
server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx,
because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from
its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation.
503
A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which.
A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response
carries Retry-After.
BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server
does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens
attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates;
while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's
code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer
match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/v1/health and GET /api/v1/ready
answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential
or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers
without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/v1/ready says when.
CAPACITY_UNAVAILABLE (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): this Gateway
is serving its maximum number of requests at once, or cannot track another allowance, or
(on a certificate login) is recording its maximum of live certificate sessions -- in which
case the session the login created has been closed. Nothing else was sent to the key
server. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.
413
PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (retryable: false) -- the request body is larger than this
deployment accepts. It was refused before it was parsed, and the connection is closed.
Nothing was sent to the key server.
429
RATE_LIMITED (retryable: true, Retry-After) -- the allowance this request is charged
to is spent: the login allowance of its network source (before authentication), or the
allowance, the concurrency ceiling or the live-session ceiling of the identity it was
verified as -- shared by every session that identity holds, including every delegated
and scoped credential a service minted. It carries no scope. Nothing was sent to the
key server; on a login refused after authentication, the session it created has been
closed. See "Rate and capacity limits" above.
Error handling
Every failure answers JSON carrying at least code and detail. Match on code — detail is written for a human debugging the call and its wording is not part of the contract. See the error model.
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
400 | BAD_REQUEST -- writes absent, not an array or empty; an entry malformed; attr is accessFlag; value not a string; or one or more xpaths do not resolve, in which case the whole batch was refused BEFORE the wire and the detail names every offender. |
401 | No live session, a DPoP proof that did not verify, or a certificate session whose certificate the key server now refuses. SESSION_NOT_FOUND -- the credential names no session this Gateway holds. SESSION_EXPIRED -- it aged out. Both carry reauth: true; obtain a new credential rather than retrying. PROOF_* -- the sender constraint refused. See the DPoP section of this document for the full table; PROOF_MALFORMED is a 400 and PROOF_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL a 503, and the rest are here. SCOPED_CREDENTIAL_EXPIRED -- a scoped browser credential passed its fixed lifetime. Use does not extend it: an idle timeout would be refreshed by exactly the traffic a stolen handle produces. CERTIFICATE_REVOKED -- on a session established by certificate login, the key server re-checks the certificate that session was established with on its operations, and it is now named by revocation evidence. detail is the key server's sentence. The Gateway answers this once and then ENDS everything that service holds or minted here -- its sessions, the delegated sessions and the scoped credentials it minted -- so a later operation on any of them is SESSION_NOT_FOUND. Log in with a different certificate. SSO_SESSION_EXPIRED -- a single-sign-on session (POST /api/v1/session/oidc) reached its lifetime, or was idle past its binding's idle bound; it has been ended. Sign in again. SENDER_KEY_RETIRED -- the session's registered sender key was rotated out and its overlap has passed (see "The registered service's credential lifecycle"); the session is closed with this answer. SERVICE_REGISTRATION_ENDED -- the registration a service credential was issued under was removed or narrowed on this Gateway; it has ended. Both are final for that credential. |
403 | Authenticated, and refused. The codes differ in what they say about where the refusal came from: ACCESS_DENIED (no role grants the operation), ACL_DENIED (the ACL of the key the request named refuses the principal -- ask the key's owner, not an administrator), PRINCIPAL_DISABLED and DELEGATOR_REFUSED are the key server's -- the last one on a DELEGATED session whose delegator has since been disabled, lost its DELEGATION flag, been unenrolled or had its certificate revoked; its detail is the key server's sentence naming the delegator, and no new login helps until an administrator restores it. REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE and REVOCATION_EVIDENCE_STALE are the key server's too, on a session established by certificate login: the same re-check found no current revocation evidence for that certificate's issuer under a policy that requires it -- the credential is not what was refused, and an operator importing a current CRL for the issuer is what helps. TRANSPORT_PRINCIPAL_REQUIRED (POST /api/v1/keys/get: the operation needs a session established by a certificate the key server has enrolled) and PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH (the request named a principal other than the session's) are the key server's too, and no role changes either -- while NOT_WRITABLE, BUILT_IN_PRINCIPAL, OWN_ACCOUNT and OBJECT_NOT_IN_CREDENTIAL_SCOPE are decided by the Gateway before anything is sent. |
409 | NOT_VERIFIED -- the key server did not refuse the batch, and the read-back does not show every requested value stored. |
500 | A fault rather than a refusal. OP_FAILED is the catch-all: the key server refused in words that match no classified pattern, so the Gateway cannot say more than that the operation did not happen. Some key server refusals that are conceptually a caller error arrive here rather than as a 4xx, because the wire carries no distinguishing code -- where a route can recognise one from its message it maps it, and each such mapping is documented on the operation. |
503 | A capacity ceiling or a missing deployment prerequisite. retryable says which. A scope of session or process names the ceiling that was hit, and the response carries Retry-After. BUILD_NOT_ADMITTED (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): the key server does not admit this Gateway's client build. Every key-server connection the Gateway opens attests the signed release it runs (TE_RELEASE_MANIFEST) right after it authenticates; while that attestation is refused -- the release is not registered at the key server's code-signing level, the level was raised under it, or the installed files no longer match the signed manifest -- every route but GET /api/v1/health and GET /api/v1/ready answers this, and detail names the cause. It is never a 401 or a 403: no credential or role of the caller's is at fault. The Gateway re-attempts on a timer and recovers without a restart once the key server admits it; GET /api/v1/ready says when. CAPACITY_UNAVAILABLE (scope: process, retryable: true, Retry-After): this Gateway is serving its maximum number of requests at once, or cannot track another allowance, or (on a certificate login) is recording its maximum of live certificate sessions -- in which case the session the login created has been closed. Nothing else was sent to the key server. See "Rate and capacity limits" above. |
413 | PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE (retryable: false) -- the request body is larger than this deployment accepts. It was refused before it was parsed, and the connection is closed. Nothing was sent to the key server. |
429 | RATE_LIMITED (retryable: true, Retry-After) -- the allowance this request is charged to is spent: the login allowance of its network source (before authentication), or the allowance, the concurrency ceiling or the live-session ceiling of the identity it was verified as -- shared by every session that identity holds, including every delegated and scoped credential a service minted. It carries no scope. Nothing was sent to the key server; on a login refused after authentication, the session it created has been closed. See "Rate and capacity limits" above. |